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Facing up to Wrongful Convictions:




The recent rise of DNA exonerations has increased Americans'
awareness that our criminal justice system condemns innocent people for
crimes they did not commit.' The continued legitimacy of our justice
system depends on the resolve with which we address this failing.
The writ of habeas corpus is a time-honored mechanism for
remedying unjust incarcerations! Claims of actual innocence arise in
habeas proceedings in two main ways. First, prisoners assert
"substantive" innocence claims under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. In these petitions, prisoners argue that because they are
factually innocent of the crimes for which they were convicted, their
incarcerations violate due process and the ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.
The second type of actual innocence claim is known as a "gateway"
claim. In gateway claims, the prisoner asserts actual innocence in order
to obtain review of a procedurally defaulted habeas petition. A petition
is procedurally barred if it is "successive" or "abusive."3 A petition is
successive if it raises claims identical to claims that were denied on the
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008. 1 am grateful to
Professors Aaron Rappaport and Rory Little for their suggestions. I would also like to thank Lynn
Combs, my family, and of course my wife Jisun.
i. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION'S AD Hoc INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY
OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY, at xv
(Jack Hanna ed., 2o06) (noting that the escalating number of DNA exonerations "undermines the
assumption that the criminal justice system our nation has so proudly developed sufficiently protects
the innocent").
2. At the founding of the nation, for example, in The Federalist No. 84, Alexander Hamilton
echoed Blackstone's belief that the writ of habeas corpus provides critical protection for individual
rights in light of the fact that "the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the
favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 213 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Maria Burwell ed., 2003).
3. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,318 (995).
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merits in a previous habeas petition.' A petition is abusive if it raises
claims that could have been raised on appeal or in a previous petition but
were not.' A prisoner may also default by failing to comply with the
applicable statute of limitations. Normally, a prisoner may only obtain
review of a procedurally barred petition if he is able to demonstrate good
cause and prejudice.7
In capital cases, the Supreme Court has carved out an equitable
exception to the cause-and-prejudice requirement. In Murray v. Carrier,
the Court held that "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence
of a showing of cause for the procedural default.",8 This exception
recognizes that incarcerating the innocent works a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice."9 In short, by demonstrating actual innocence, a
prisoner may pass through the actual innocence "gateway" and receive
review of his procedurally barred claim.
In Schiup v. Delo,'° the Supreme Court articulated the standard for
determining whether a prisoner may pass through the actual innocence
gateway. The Court held that in order to establish actual innocence, the
prisoner must demonstrate that in light of "new reliable evidence.., that
was not presented at trial," it is more likely than not that no reasonable
juror would vote to convict." In House v. Bell, the Supreme Court found
a gateway petitioner innocent for the first time." Neither Schiup nor
House provided the Court with an opportunity to define exactly what
qualifies as "new" evidence.
Because the Supreme Court has not defined "new," the circuit
courts of appeals have arrived at different definitions. Some circuits
adopt an inclusive formulation. These circuits permit habeas courts to
evaluate all reliable evidence that was not presented to the finder of fact,
even if the evidence would have been available at trial through the
exercise of due diligence. This Note refers to these circuits' rule as the
"newly-presented" evidence rule.
Other circuits adopt a more restrictive interpretation. These circuits
hold that habeas courts may only review evidence if it was discovered
4. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986).
5. Id. (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1963)).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(I) (2ooo) (providing a one-year limitations period for state prisoners
to file a federal habeas petition).
7. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 (I977).
8. 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
9. Id.
I0. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
it. Id. at 324, 326-27 (emphasis added).
12. 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2o83 (2oo6).
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post-conviction, and if it could not have been discovered prior to trial
through the exercise of due diligence. This formulation bars reviewing
courts from evaluating any evidence which was available at the time of
trial but was not admitted due to the actions of defense counsel, the
petitioner, or the trial judge. This Note refers to these circuits' rule as the
"newly-discovered" evidence rule.
This Note argues that the federal courts should adopt the newly-
presented rule rather than the newly-discovered rule. The newly-
presented rule strikes an evenhanded balance between petitioners' rights
and notions such as federal-state comity, judicial economy, and the
finality of judgments. The newly-presented rule permits habeas courts to
meaningfully review petitioners' actual innocence claims while also
protecting the federal courts from abusive litigation. Accordingly, the
newly-presented rule is in harmony with the values underpinning our
criminal justice system and should be uniformly adopted.
Part I of this Note examines the problem of wrongful convictions
that afflicts our criminal justice system. Part II summarizes the current
state of habeas corpus law with respect to claims of actual innocence.
Part III argues that the federal courts should adopt the newly-presented
evidence rule for three reasons: (I) the newly-presented rule
meaningfully accounts for the problems that attend real-world wrongful
convictions; (2) the rule is in harmony with our structure of government;
and (3) the rule is consistent with the language and rationale of Schlup
and House. Part IV concludes that the newly-presented rule is necessary
to preserve our deep-seated notions of individual liberty.
I. THE EMERGING PROBLEM OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
It is a bedrock principle of American law that we would rather free
the guilty than convict the innocent.'3 Unlike the inquisitorial systems of
Continental Europe, our adversarial system erects numerous protections
for the accused.'" Indeed, "[n]o principle is more firmly established in our
system of criminal justice than the presumption of innocence that is
accorded to the defendant in every criminal trial."' 5
Despite this emphasis on protecting the innocent, Americans are
increasingly aware that some wrongly convicted people occupy our
prisons. Numerous case studies reveal the grim details of innocent people
13. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[It is] a fundamental
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free.").
14. Felicity Nagorcka et al., Stranded Between Partisanship and the Truth? A Comparative
Analysis of Legal Ethics in the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice, 29 MELB. U. L. REV.
448, 462 (2oo5) (noting that through the use of "strict evidential and procedural boundaries,"
adversarial systems place greater value on the protection of the individual than inquisitorial systems).
15. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 790 (I979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
convicted of crimes they did not commit." Fortunately, in recent years, a
handful of wrongly convicted prisoners have obtained exonerations.
7
Despite this encouraging trend, the percentage of wrongfully
convicted people who attain exoneration is very small. According to
Lawrence Marshall, only one in three exonerated prisoners achieves his
freedom through the "normal course" of appellate and habeas review
rather than the fortuitous, post-conviction discovery of exculpatory
evidence. ' It is therefore unclear how many innocent people fill our
prisons because they lack the extraordinary resources or good luck
necessary to establish actual innocence under the current state of the law.
A number of studies estimate the scope of the wrongful conviction
problem. C. Ronald Huff estimates that between 7,500 and io,ooo
innocent people are sent to prison every year.'9 Another study suggests
the figure is as high as 14,000.2 Still others provide chilling figures for the
wrongful conviction rate in murder cases' and the "serious error" rate in
capital cases.2 It is outside the scope of this Note to debate the
methodological strengths and weaknesses of such studies. What is clear is
that our criminal justice system routinely convicts untold numbers of
innocent people. 3
16. See generally MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992); BARRY SCHECK ET
AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED (2ooo); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How
TO MAKE IT RIGHT (2003) [hereinafter SCHECK, JUSTICE]; MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY: WHEN
INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE WRONGLY CONVICTED (1991).
I7. Three hundred forty people obtained post-conviction exoneration between 1989 and 2003.
Samuel Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005). To date, at least 210 people have been exonerated through post-
conviction DNA testing alone. The Innocence Project,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/35 i.php (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
i8. Lawrence Marshall, Do Exonerations Prove That "The System Works?," 86 JUDICATURE 83, 84
(2002). Defendants obtain exoneration most frequently only if (I) the real guilty party steps forward,
(2) compelling new evidence impeaches the prosecution's witnesses, or (3) DNA testing exculpates the
defendant. Id. at 84, 86-87.
19. See RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT 65 (1996) (estimating that approximately
io,ooo people are erroneously convicted each year); Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction and Public
Policy: The American Society of Criminology 20oi Presidential Address, 40 CRIMINOLOGY I, 2 (2002)
(suggesting that 7,500 people were wrongfully convicted in 2000).
2o. Ayre Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System,
12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 285 (1988) (citing a 1964 study that estimated a 5% erroneous conviction
rate that results in 14,000 wrongful convictions each year).
2t. Tony G. Poveda, Estimating Wrongful Convictions, 18 JUST. Q. 689, 697 (2ooi) (finding a
1.4% wrongful conviction rate in murder cases). In 2002, there were 8,99o murder convictions in state
courts. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLLETIN: FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 2002, at 2 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/fssco2.pdf. Applying
Poveda's error rate to this figure, approximately 125 murder defendants were wrongfully convicted in
2002.
22. James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, r973-i995, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1839, 1850 (2000) (identifying a 68% "serious error" rate in capital cases nationwide).
23. See, e.g., SCHECK, JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 249 (noting that the "DNA era has shaken the
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With some exceptions, the federal and state judiciaries have been
largely unmoved by the data on wrongful convictions. There are
numerous reasons why the courts are reluctant to recognize a serious
wrongful conviction problem. Many skeptics argue that the estimated
number of innocent prisoners is inflated, or that the wrongful conviction
of several thousand people does not present a serious problem.24 Justice
Antonin Scalia has argued that the increase in exonerations over the past
decade suggests that the system works, rather than that it is broken. 5
Many judges are also likely hesitant to test the public's confidence in our
justice system by acknowledging that the courts are capable of convicting
a large number of innocent people."
Legislative and executive bodies, however, have enacted a variety of
reforms in response to the wrongful conviction problem. For example,
data on innocent convictions have influenced the adoption of capital
punishment bans and moratoria in some states. 7 Almost all states have
passed laws granting access to post-conviction DNA tests for certain
classes of defendants." In order to ensure the effective and accurate use
of DNA testing, many states have passed laws that mandate the retention
and preservation of DNA evidence. 9 Some state attorneys general have
adopted the so-called "double-blind" eyewitness identification procedure
to reduce the number of false identifications.3° Many states have sought
foundations of the system" so profoundly that "[t]he strong presumption that verdicts are correct has
been weakened"); George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency,
and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 273 (2003) ("[Even if the system screens out most of
the innocent suspects, a small error rate means that large numbers of real people, real innocents,
convicted of crime, remain in the system.").
24. See, e.g., Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006
Wis. L. REV. 739,743.
25. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2536 (2oo6) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Reversal of an
erroneous conviction on appeal or on habeas, or the pardoning of an innocent condemnee through
executive clemency, demonstrates not the failure of the system but its success.").
26. James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2132 (2000)
("[W]rongful convictions, and retrials and appeals... cost taxpayers millions of dollars [and]...
foster[] a corrosive distrust in [the judiciary].").
27. See John Wagner & Ovetta Wiggins, O'Malley Seeks End to Md. Executions: Death Penalty
Repeal Splits Assembly, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2007, at 16; Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Death Penalty
Moratorium Implementation Project, http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/faq.html#a6 (last visited Jan.
1. 2008) (noting Illinois moratorium); Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/state/ (providing state-by-state information including states that prohibit the death penalty
and the number of innocence exonerations per state).
28. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1405 (West 2005) (DNA testing for all felons); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 176.O918 (1996) (DNA testing for capital defendants); Innocence Protection Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3600 (DNA testing for all persons convicted of a federal crime).
29. For a thorough bibliography of state retention statutes, see Nathan T. Kipp, Comment,
Preserving Due Process: Violations of Wisconsin DNA Evidence Preservation Statutes as Per Se
Violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1245 , 1256 n.73.
30. See, e.g., N.J. DEP'T OF LAW AND PUB. SAFETY, OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., GUIDELINES FOR
PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2001), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/1ps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf (following letter from the New Jersey Attorney
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to reduce the number of false confessions by requiring police officers to
electronically record interrogations.' Other reforms include crime lab
oversight measures," exoneree compensation statutes,33 and independent
innocence commissions to investigate non-frivolous claims of actual
innocence.34
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIMS UNDER
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS LAW
As noted above, substantive and gateway actual innocence claims
differ in significant ways. Substantive claims assert that because the
prisoner is factually innocent of the crime, the petitioner's incarceration
substantively violates the Constitution. Although the Supreme Court has
never reversed a conviction on substantive grounds, the remedy in such a
case would likely be unconditional release from custody.
In Herrera v. Collins, the leading substantive innocence decision, the
petitioner sought habeas relief from a death sentence.35 In support of his
claim of innocence, Herrera presented newly acquired affidavits which
tended to show that Herrera's brother, rather than Herrera, committed
the murder at issue.36 Although the Supreme Court indicated that a
"truly persuasive" showing of actual innocence may warrant habeas
relief under substantive constitutional provisions, the Court ruled that
Herrera's affidavits failed to meet this high standard.37 Accordingly, the
Court affirmed Herrera's death sentence.'
Unlike Herrera petitioners, gateway petitioners do not assert bare
innocence claims. Instead, gateway prisoners allege constitutional defects
at trial such as ineffective assistance of counsel. These petitioners assert
actual innocence because they are unable to show good cause for
procedurally defaulting on their constitutional claims. They therefore
seek to avail themselves of the miscarriage of justice exception to the ban
on procedurally defaulted petitions. The ultimate goal of a gateway claim
General outlining that New Jersey's plan for the double-blind procedure); Wis. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF THE AT'Y GEN., MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2005),
available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf (adopting the double-blind for
investigations in Wisconsin).
31. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (Vernon 2006); State v. Scales, 518 N.W. 2d
587 (Minn. 1994).
32. See, e.g., H.B. io68, 2005 Leg., 79th Sess. (TEX. 2005); Montana SB 768.
33. The Innocence Project compiled an exhaustive list of these statutes, which is available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Bernhard-Charto131 o6.pdf.
34. S. Res. 44, - Leg., - Sess. (Cal. 2004) (creating the California Commission on the Fair
Administration of Justice); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-I462 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007) (establishing North
Carolina's Actual Innocence Commission).
35. 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 418-19.
38. Id. at 419.
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is to obtain review of the petitioner's underlying constitutional claim.
The remedy for a successful gateway claim is not release from custody,
but review of the petitioner's otherwise barred habeas petition.
In Schlup, the petitioner was convicted of murdering a fellow inmate
in a Missouri state prison.39 Schlup filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.4' The
reviewing court denied the petition as procedurally barred.' In a second
habeas petition, also procedurally barred, Schlup renewed his ineffective
assistance claim and introduced an actual innocence miscarriage of
justice argument.' Schlup supported his actual innocence claim with
affidavits from newly discovered witnesses who testified that Schlup did
not commit the murder at issue.43 In evaluating Schlup's petition, the
Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy the threshold showing of
actual innocence, the prisoner must demonstrate that, in light of "new
reliable evidence.., that was not presented at trial," it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would vote to convict.' The Schlup
Court provided no explicit guidance regarding what evidence qualifies as
"'new."
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Schlup in House v.
Bell.45 In House, the Court permitted a petitioner to pass through the
actual innocence gateway for the first time.46 House based his innocence
claim on several pieces of newly-discovered evidence, including
exculpatory witnesses, DNA testing, and other forensic evidence.47 The
Court concluded that although House did not conclusively establish his
innocence, he represented a rare case in which, due to the weight of the
evidence discovered post-conviction, no reasonable juror would lack
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.8 Similar to Schlup, House involved
newly-discovered rather than newly-presented evidence. As such, the
case did not present the Supreme Court with an opportunity to endorse
either the newly-discovered or the newly-presented evidence rule.49
39. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 305 (1995).
40. Id. at 306.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 307.
43. Id.
44- Id. at 324, 327.
45. 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2077-78 (2oo6).
46. Id. at 2086.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 2086-87.
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A. THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS DISAGREE REGARDING WHAT FORMS
OF "NEW" EVIDENCE PETITIONERS MAY PRESENT FOR REVIEW IN
GATEWAY CLAIMS
The circuit courts of appeals disagree regarding what the Supreme
Court means by "new" evidence in the context of gateway claims. On the
one hand, it is possible to infer from Justice Stevens's majority opinion in
Schlup that he intended to admit all newly-presented evidence,
regardless of whether the evidence was available at the time of trial."
Justice Stevens conspicuously employed the word "presented" rather
than the word "discovered."5' Similarly, the majority in House appeared
to endorse liberal evidentiary rules for gateway petitions. Building on
language found in Schlup, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion stressed
that in evaluating gateway claims, a habeas court's inquiry is not limited
solely to "new reliable evidence ... that was not presented at trial."52
Justice Kennedy did not expound, however, on what the limits are.
On the other hand, it is possible to interpret Schlup as implying a
newly-discovered rule. Because Schlup's affidavits contained testimony
from witnesses who were discovered after Schlup was convicted, the facts
of Schlup limit the Court's holding to newly-discovered evidence. 3 The
same is true of House v. Bell.54 In addition, Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Schlup suggests that she intended the decision to
only permit newly-discovered evidence, based on her use of the word
"discovered" rather than the word "presented.""
As a result of this ambiguity, the circuit courts of appeals have
adopted different definitions of "new." Some circuits allow petitioners to
submit all evidence which was not presented to the fact finder, regardless
of whether the evidence was available for trial. Other circuits restrict
review to evidence discovered after the petitioner's conviction.
The courts that permit all newly-presented evidence rely largely on
the language of Schlup to support their conclusion. First, they look to the
Schlup Court's choice of words. For example, the Seventh Circuit
examined the text of Justice Stevens's majority opinion and concluded
that, because the decision employed the word "presented" rather than
the word "discovered," "[ajll Schlup requires is that the new evidence is
reliable and that it was not presented at trial." 6 In the absence of an
explicit directive to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit declined to
"consider the absence of a newly 'discovered' requirement in Schlup a
50. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 289, 324 (1995).
51. Id.
52. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2077 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).
53. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 308 n.i8.
54. House, 126 S. Ct. at 2086.
55. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2003).
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mere oversight."57 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that although
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Schiup would require newly-
discovered evidence, the use of the word "presented" in Justice Stevens's
opinion suggests that "a habeas petitioner may pass through the Schiup
gateway without 'newly discovered' evidence if other reliable evidence is
offered 'that was not presented at trial."'' 8
The courts that adopt the newly-presented rule identify a second
source of textual support for their position. They cite the Schiup Court's
favorable reference to Judge Henry J. Friendly's argument that habeas
courts should review "'all evidence, including that alleged to have been
admitted illegally . . . and evidence tenably claimed to have been
wrongfully excluded or to have become available only after the trial."'59
For example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Schlup's reference to
Judge Friendly's article weighed strongly in favor of the newly-presented
rule.6° Likewise, the district court in Garcia v. Portuondo cited the Schlup
Court's reference to Judge Friendly in concluding that it did "not
understand 'new' evidence to be limited to that unavailable at trial, so
long as it is evidence that the original fact finder did not then consider.",
6,
Other circuits adopt the newly-discovered evidence rule. The Eighth
Circuit, for example, noted in an early attempt to define "new" evidence
that "[p]utting a different spin on evidence that was presented to the jury
does not satisfy the requirements set forth in Schlup.' '62 In a later case,
without explanation, the Eighth Circuit expanded this holding into a
bright-line rule that "evidence is new only if it was not available at trial
and could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due
diligence. ',6' The Eighth Circuit has adhered to this definition in later
cases.6
The Third Circuit defends its newly-discovered rule on the grounds
of judicial economy and the finality of judgments. In Hubbard v.
Pinchak, the prisoner attempted to introduce his own testimony as new
evidence, even though he was available during trial and did not testify.6
57. Id.
58. Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003).
59. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 142, 160 (970)); Griffin, 350 F.3d at 961-62.
60. Griffin, 350 F.3 d at 961-62.
6I. Garcia v. Portuondo, 334 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
62. Bannister v. Delo, ioo F.3d 6io, 618 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bannister v. Delo, 904 F. Supp.
988, 1o04 (W.D. Mo. 1995)).
63. Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1230 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Amrine v. Bowersox, 238
F.3d 1023, 1029 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[Tlhe petitioner's allegations of constitutional error must be
supported with new reliable evidence not available at trial.") (emphasis added).
64. See Osborne v. Purkett, 4I1 F.3d 911, 920 (8th Cir. 2005) (denying gateway relief to a
petitioner who proffered testimony which "existed at the time of trial and could have been discovered
earlier had [the defendant] or his counsel diligently pursued it").
65. 378 F.3d 333, 340 (3 d Cir. 2004).
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The court rejected the petitioner's claim that his testimony was "new,"
concluding that the innocence gateway did not provide relief to prisoners
who regret the strategic decisions they made during trial.66 The court
concluded that the prisoner's testimony was a mere "repackaging of the
record as presented at trial," and it denied relief in light of its concern
that a different outcome would "set the bar for 'actual innocence'
claimants so low that virtually every such claimant would pass through
it.,,67
III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE "NEWLY-PRESENTED" EVIDENCE RULE
The federal courts should adopt the newly-presented evidence rule. The
newly-presented rule permits habeas courts to evaluate all reliable evidence
which was wrongly excluded by defense counsel, the petitioner, or the trial
judge. The newly-presented rule is preferable for three reasons. First, the
rule meaningfully accounts for the real-world circumstances that attend
erroneous convictions. Second, the rule adequately accounts for
considerations such as federal-state comity, judicial economy, and the
finality of judgments. Third, the rule is the most logical interpretation of
Schlup and House.
A. THE NEWLY-PRESENTED RULE IMPLICATES THREE FORMS OF
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
There are three forms of evidence implicated by the newly-presented
evidence rule. The first type is evidence which was not presented to the
finder of fact due to the conduct of the petitioner's trial counsel. The second
is evidence which was not presented to the fact finder due to decisions made
by the petitioner. The third is evidence excluded by the trial judge.
i. Evidence Excluded Due to the Conduct of Trial Counsel
The majority of exculpatory evidence wrongly excluded at trial is
likely attributable to the actions of defense counsel. Overworked or
incompetent attorneys sometimes fail to conduct diligent investigations
which would reveal exculpatory evidence. In other instances, defense
attorneys may fail to introduce exculpatory evidence even if the
attorneys are aware of its existence. For example, defense attorneys
often counsel their clients not to take the stand, even if the finder of fact
could benefit from hearing the defendant's side of the story. Because
defense attorneys control the presentation of their clients' cases, the
majority of wrongly excluded exculpatory evidence is likely excluded due
to the actions of defense counsel.
2. Evidence Excluded by the Conduct of the Petitioner
The second category of evidence implicated by the newly-presented rule
66. Id.
67. Id. at 341.
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is evidence which was not admitted at trial due to the conduct of the
petitioner. The principal form of evidence in this category is the petitioner's
own testimony. In the majority of cases, the petitioner alleges that he failed
to testify as the result of bad advice from his attorney. In rare instances,
however, the petitioner is personally responsible for his decision not to
testify.
There are myriad reasons why innocent defendants do not testify.
One reason is that many innocent defendants plead guilty and never
reach the trial stage.68 Other times, even if the case reaches trial, innocent
defendants decline to testify because they are confident in their
innocence and decide to put the state to its proof. Some innocent
defendants choose not to take the stand because they have criminal
records and are afraid that testifying will open the door for the
prosecutor to admit prejudicial prior convictions into evidence.69 Many
times, innocent defendants decline to testify because they are
uneducated or mentally ill, and testifying will create a risk that they will
make a poor impression on the jury, or that the prosecutor will trick and
confuse them on cross-examination.7" Many innocent defendants have
already provided false confessions to the police.7' Subjecting these
vulnerable individuals to further interrogation in front of the jury is ill-
advised. Last, some defendants from ethnic minority communities
believe that testifying in front of predominantly white juries does more
harm than good because perceived cultural and ethnic differences will
bias white jurors against them.72
3. Evidence Excluded by the Trial Judge
It should be noted that, as a literal matter, evidence excluded by the
trial judge falls within the ambit of the newly-presented rule. Because the
Supreme Court explicitly approved the use of all evidence regardless of
admissibility at trial, however, judicially excluded evidence is not
implicated by the newly-presented rule. The Supreme Court explicitly
endorsed the admissibility of this form of evidence when it cited Judge
68. Paul Craig Roberts, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, 7 INDEP. REV. 567, 572 (2003).
69. See Fed. R. Evid. 6o9 (permitting the impeachment of a witness's credibility through the
admission of prior convictions); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 330 (199).
70. See Schulhofer, supra note 69.
71. Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back in: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in
the Twenty-First Century, 2oo6 Wis. L. REv. 479, 484 (noting that between 20% and 25% of
documented DNA exonerations involved wrongful convictions that "resulted in whole or in part from
police-induced false confessions").
72. Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST.
J. Cium. L. 121, 126 (2oo6) ("White jurors more readily believe that blacks will continue to be
dangerous in the future and are more likely to ignore mitigating evidence, treating instances of the
defendant's bad character as more representative of the 'true character' of people of 'his kind' than
instances of good behavior.").
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Friendly's law review article in both Schlup and House.73
B. THE PROBLEM OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS COMPELS THE ADOPTION OF
THE NEWLY-PRESENTED RULE
In evaluating gateway claims, habeas courts should be permitted to
review all reliable evidence that was not presented to the finder of fact. The
purpose of the miscarriage of justice exception is to facilitate review of
innocent prisoners' constitutional claims. Consistent with this goal, the
gateway doctrine should account for the real-world circumstances that
attend erroneous convictions. Admitting all reliable evidence wrongly
excluded from trial helps accomplish this goal by correcting the critical
evidentiary defects that contributed to the wrongful conviction in the first
place. The newly-presented evidence rule gives meaningful content to the
gateway doctrine by enabling habeas courts to make comprehensive
assessments of the circumstances surrounding each petitioner's case.
i. Requiring Prisoners to Acquire New Evidence After Conviction
Is Unrealistic
An obvious advantage of the newly-presented rule is that it accounts
for the difficulty of obtaining exculpatory evidence post-conviction.
Experience demonstrates that a prisoner's inability to produce new
exculpatory evidence does not necessarily confirm the person's guilt.74
The newly-presented rule furthers the protection of individual liberty
because it enables habeas courts to identify a greater number of wrongly
convicted prisoners than would otherwise be possible.
There are myriad problems associated with relying solely on newly-
discovered evidence to exonerate the wrongly convicted. DNA
exonerations provide one example. Although post-conviction DNA
testing is among the most reliable methods of exoneration, not every case
involves DNA evidence. 75 Even in cases in which DNA evidence would
be relevant to the person's guilt or innocence, DNA samples are
frequently unavailable. 76 Although DNA evidence is generally more
reliable than other physical evidence, DNA samples are also subject to
degradation and destruction due to bad faith, neglect, and the passage of
time.77 Overemphasis on newly-discovered DNA evidence is therefore ill-
advised.
73. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995); see also House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2078
(2oo6).
74. See Marshall, supra note 18, at 84 (noting that most exonerations result from exculpatory
evidence discovered "through completely unpredictable events extrinsic to the checks and balances
intrinsic to the legal system").
75. See Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly-
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 655, 656 (2oo5).
76. Id. at 656-57.
77. Id.
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It is also impractical to expect new witnesses, dishonest law
enforcement officials, and unidentified guilty parties to reveal
themselves. It is impossible to know the secret motives of those who may
step forward. The likelihood of exculpatory witnesses identifying
themselves is particularly low if exonerating a defendant would place the
new witness at risk of prosecution.
It is likewise unrealistic to assume that every criminal defendant has
been afforded zealous representation, even if the deficiencies in
representation do not necessarily rise to the level of ineffective assistance
of counsel. It is well known that public defenders are chronically under-
funded and overworked."5 It is also notable that many high-profile
exonerations result from the efforts of dedicated journalists, students,
and other non-attorney actors, rather than from the efforts of defense
lawyers.79 These facts suggest that inadequate representation is far more
prevalent than is commonly known.
Last, it takes several years for a prisoner to exhaust his state
remedies and file a procedurally barred habeas petition. 8° Even if the
judiciary were not plagued by chronic appellate delays,"' it would take
years for the average prisoner to file a procedurally barred habeas
petition and attempt to pass through the innocence gateway. It is
common sense that the likelihood of discovering exculpatory evidence
drops over time. As the Supreme Court has recognized, defendants can
be prejudiced over time by the death and disappearance of witnesses, the
fading of memories, and the destruction or degradation of physical
evidence." In light of these difficulties, the newly-presented evidence
rule allows courts to flush out a greater number of innocent prisoners.
This result is consistent with the purpose of the miscarriage of justice
exception.
2. The Newly-Presented Evidence Rule Results in Greater
Protection of Individual Liberties for the Wrongly Convicted
With the exception of the petitioner in House v. Bell, every successful
gateway petitioner since Schlup has established his innocence through a
combination of (I) newly-presented evidence, (2) newly-discovered
evidence, and (3) a re-examination of the evidence adduced at trial. These
78. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1036 (2006).
79. Marshall, supra note i8, at 84.
8o. In Schlup, for example, the murder at issue occurred in February 1984. Schlup v. Delo, 513
U.S. 298, 301 (1995). Schlup's actual innocence claim was not ultimately resolved on remand until
December 1995, nearly twelve years later. Schlup v. Delo, 912 F. Supp. 448, 455 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
81. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE 109-1o (199o), reprint in 22 CONN. L. REv.
733 (199o) ("However people may view other aspects of the federal judiciary, few deny that its
appellate courts are in a 'crisis of volume' that has transformed them from the institutions they were
even a generation ago.").
82. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992).
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successful gateway petitioners demonstrate that the newly-presented
evidence rule is instrumental in identifying innocent prisoners, as illustrated
in Souter v. Jones.
83
In Souter, the Sixth Circuit found the gatewa€ claimant actually
innocent based in part on newly-presented evidence. In addition to re-
examining the evidence introduced at trial, the court examined (i) the
recantations of two of the prosecution's former expert witnesses; (2) new
statements from a bottle manufacturer that its product could not have
formed the sharp edge that inflicted the fatal wound; and (3) exculpatory
photographs which were available at the time of trial but were not
presented to the jury.85 The court held that the petitioner's new evidence
cast substantial doubt on the petitioner's guilt and undermined the
court's confidence in the result at trial.6
The first piece of "new" evidence in Souter-the expert witnesses'
recanted testimony-qualifies as "newly-discovered" evidence because
the experts did not formulate their new opinions until after Souter was
convicted.8' This evidence did not, therefore, exist at the time of trial and
was newly-discovered for the purposes of the petitioner's gateway claim.
By contrast, the evidence from the bottle manufacturer was newly-
presented. Although the petitioner's trial counsel did not obtain a statement
from the bottle manufacturer prior to trial, there is little doubt that he or she
could have done so through the exercise of due diligence. This evidence
would therefore have been excluded under a newly-discovered evidence
rule.
The exculpatory photographs were likewise newly-presented. The
prosecution argued that because defense counsel knew the photos
existed at the time of trial, the photos did not constitute "new"
evidence. 8 The Souter court disagreed, holding that even if the photos
were available at the time of trial, "there is no evidence in the record that
they were ever presented to the jury and therefore, are new evidence in
support of Souter's actual innocence claim under Schlup."' The court
therefore admitted the photographs after explicitly characterizing the
pictures as newly-presented rather than newly-discovered evidence.
In the absence of this newly-presented evidence, the Souter court
would not have found the petitioner to be innocent. Indeed, it was the
cumulative weight of the newly-presented, newly-discovered, and
83. 395 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2005).
84. Id. at 590.
85. Id. at 590-92.
86. Id. at 597.
87. Id. at 592 (noting that if the expert's opinion has changed, "the evidence itself has changed,
and can most certainly be characterized as new.").
88. Id. at 596 n.9.
89. Id.
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previously introduced trial evidence that tipped the scale in the
petitioner's favor.' ° The newly-presented rule was therefore instrumental
in the court's determination because the combined effect of all the
evidence empowered the court to discover the true circumstances of the
case. The great majority of other decisions have arrived at similar
outcomes.9
3. At a Minimum, the Newly-Presented Evidence Rule Should
Apply to All Evidence Tenably Claimed to Have Been Excluded
Due to the Errors of Defense Counsel
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Gomez illustrates the importance
of admitting all evidence tenably claimed to have been excluded due to
the actions of defense counsel. In Gomez, the petitioner asserted the
miscarriage of justice exception on a procedurally barred habeas
petition.9" The prisoner based his actual innocence claim on his own
testimony, which was not presented at trial.93 Gomez's underlying
constitutional claim was ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim was
due to his attorney's alleged failure to advise or call Gomez to testify.94
The Gomez court admitted the petitioner's testimony, holding that
"where the underlying constitutional violation claimed is the ineffective
assistance of counsel premised on a failure to present evidence, a
requirement that new evidence be unknown to the defense at the time of
trial would operate as a roadblock to the actual innocence gateway."95
The Gomez court thus recognized that where the prisoner asserts
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to introduce exculpatory
evidence, the newly-discovered rule would strip the miscarriage of justice
exception of its express purpose -identifying innocent prisoners.
Therefore, at a minimum, habeas courts should be permitted to review
all evidence tenably claimed to have been excluded due to the errors of
defense counsel.
C. THE NEWLY-PRESENTED RULE DOES NOT UNDERMINE FEDERAL-STATE
COMITY, JUDICIAL ECONOMY, OR THE FINALITY OF STATE JUDGMENTS
Critics assert that the newly-presented evidence rule erodes federal-
state relations; that it wastes scarce judicial resources; and that it
undermines the finality of criminal judgments. 6 As demonstrated above,
allowing courts to examine all reliable, newly-presented evidence does
9
o. Id. at 596-97.
91. See, e.g., Smith v. Baldwin, 466 F.3d 805, 8o7 (9th Cir. 2006); Lisker v. Knowles, 463 F. Supp.
2d ioo8, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Garcia v. Portuondo, 334 F. Supp. 2d 446, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
92. Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673,677 (7th Cir. 2003).
93. Id.
94- Id.
95. Id. at 679-80.
96. See Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3 d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2004).
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result in the review of a larger number of procedurally barred habeas
petitions than would be possible under the newly-discovered evidence
rule. It is also true that whenever federal courts review state judgments,
federalism, judicial economy, and finality are serious concerns.97
Despite these concerns, the Seventh Circuit's application of the
newly-presented rule in Gomez illustrates that the newly-presented rule
does not present a serious threat to finality, comity, or judicial economy.
As noted above, the Gomez court permitted the petitioner to submit his
own newly-presented testimony in an attempt to pass through the actual
innocence gateway.' After reviewing the petitioner's testimony, the
court declined to review the petitioner's underlying constitutional claim.99
Rather, the court noted that it is "extremely rare" for prisoners to pass
through the actual innocence gateway." The court examined Gomez's
new testimony with great skepticism and denied relief.''
The result in Gomez is typical.' 2 As the Schlup Court recognized,
the miscarriage of justice exception is inherently tailored to account for
finality, comity, and judicial economy.'" Even if a gateway petitioner is
permitted to submit all newly-presented evidence, the petitioner still
must convince the reviewing court that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would vote to convict him. If the petitioner succeeds in
this difficult endeavor, the prisoner must next persuade the court to grant
relief on his underlying constitutional claim.
Unlike the Herrera line of cases, the miscarriage of justice exception
does not automatically reverse state court judgments.' 4 Instead, because
gateway claims involve procedural rather than substantive violations of
the Constitution, even a favorable outcome on the underlying
constitutional claim will only result in reversal if the petitioner is able to
persuade the reviewing court that the error is not harmless."' Because
gateway relief is so difficult to achieve, the newly-presented rule does
nothing to exacerbate the minimal threat to comity, economy, and
finality which inevitably inheres in the miscarriage of justice exception.
Indeed, the only practical difference between the newly-presented rule
and the newly-discovered rule is that the former provides the most
97. See Friendly, supra note 54, at 145-46.
98. Gomez, 350 F.3d at 679-80.
99. Id. at 68o.
ioo. Id.
ioi. Id.
io2. See, e.g., David R. Dow et al., Is It Constitutional to Execute Someone Who Is Innocent (And
If It Isn't, How Can It Be Stopped Following House v. Bell)?, 42 TULSA L. REV. 277, 399-400 (2006)
(showing that, as of October 9, 2oo6, every gateway petitioner since House failed to persuade the court
he was innocent).
103. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (i995).
t04. Id. at 315.
1O5. See id. at 314-15.
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comprehensive record possible of the petitioner's guilt or innocence,
whereas the latter does not.
It is of particular importance that the judicial branch contributes to
the resolution of the wrongful conviction problem by formulating legal
rules that meaningfully account for actual innocence. Through the
reform measures discussed above, legislatures and prosecutors have in
many ways taken the lead in confronting the wrongful conviction
problem.I°6 While these measures are timely, laudable, and necessary, the
courts should not abdicate their critical role in protecting the innocent.
The judiciary's role is central for a number of reasons. First, the
legislative and executive reforms are new, rare, and vary between
jurisdictions.'" As a consequence, the reforms are untested, and their
effectiveness may differ widely from place to place. Second, the judiciary
is the sole counter-majoritarian branch in our system of government.
As such, it is incumbent on the courts to lead the way in safeguarding
individual liberties. This function is particularly important in the area of
criminal law, where politicization frequently frustrates attempts to
bolster individual rights against the state. '°9 It is therefore the judiciary's
responsibility to ensure that justice is done in its own backyard.
D. THE LANGUAGE AND RATIONALE OF SCHLUP AND HOUSE SUGGEST THAT
THE SUPREME COURT WOULD ADOPT THE NEWLY-PRESENTED RULE
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits' opinions in Gomez and Griffin set
forth compelling arguments that the Schlup majority favored the newly-
presented rule."' These courts' rationales bear little further explanation,
other than to note that in adopting the newly-discovered rule, the Eighth
and Third Circuits conspicuously fail to address the language in Schlup
suggesting that Justice Stevens preferred the newly-presented rule rather
than Justice O'Connor's newly-discovered rule. Although it is not always
true that majority opinions exert greater influence than concurring
opinions,"' in the interest of clarity, the better practice is to follow the
majority whenever possible.
io6. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
1o8. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
to9. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. REV. 703, 729 (2005).
I Io. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
uI. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. I88, 193 (i977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds."' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. i53, 169 n.15 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion))); Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part and Concurring in the Confusion. 104 MiCH. L. REV.
1951, 1954 (2006) ("When it is self-evident that the rationale of the primary opinion does not hold the
support of five justices, it should not be treated as a majority, no matter how many justices allegedly
concurred.").
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As noted above, the Eighth Circuit provides no analysis of Schlup
whatsoever."2 In particular, the Eighth Circuit failed to address Schlup's
emphasis on Judge Friendly's article."3 In citing Judge Friendly, the
Schlup Court endorsed the position that evidence which was excluded at
trial should receive review by the habeas tribunal."4 The Court reiterated
this mandate in House v. Bell."5 The Eighth Circuit's position that courts
should only review evidence discovered after trial is irreconcilable with
the spirit of this directive.
Likewise, the Third Circuit fails to address the distinction between
Justice Stevens's use of "presented" and Justice O'Connor's use of
"discovered."... 6  Rather, the Third Circuit argues that the newly-
presented rule would permit too many petitioners to pass through the
actual innocence gateway."7 As emphasized above, however, the Schlup
Court expressed no concern that any formulation of its rule would
undermine finality and comity. Instead, the Court stressed that the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception inherently balances "the
societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial
resources with the individual interest in justice."'"8 The language of
Schlup therefore suggests that the Supreme Court was satisfied that the
actual innocence gateway inherently respects finality and comity.
Because gateway relief is so rare, the introduction of newly-presented
evidence does nothing to upset this balance.
Finally, in adopting the liberal "more likely than not" standard of
proof for adjudicating gateway claims, the Schlup Court emphasized that
the "standard of proof.., reflects 'the relative importance attached to
the ultimate decision"' in the case."9 This language suggests that the
Supreme Court intended the gateway doctrine to err on the side of
protecting individual rights in light of the grave liberty interest at stake in
capital cases. The newly-presented rule is in harmony with this
preference because it enables habeas courts to evaluate the most
comprehensive record available.
112. See Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 F.3 d 1023, 1029 (8th Cir. 2001).
113. See id. In contrast with the Eighth Circuit, the Third Circuit suggested in Hubbard that habeas
corpus courts should review evidence that was excluded by the trial judge, consistent with Schlup and
Judge Friendly's reasoning. Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 2004).
114. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,327-28 (1995).
115. 126 S. Ct. 2o64, 2077 (2006) ("Schlup makes plain that the habeas court must consider 'all the
evidence,' old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would necessarily
be admitted under 'rules of admissibility that would govern at trial."'). The House Court did not have
occasion to decide between the newly-presented and newly-discovered rules, because House's new
evidence was all discovered post-conviction. Id. at 2038.
II6. See Hubbard, 378 F.3d at 339-41.
117. Id.
i8. Schlup, 530 U.S. at 324.
i9. Id. at 325 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,370 (97o) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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CONCLUSION
The legitimacy of our criminal justice system depends on our
dedication to repairing its imperfections. Although the Supreme Court
has been generally unmoved by the data on wrongful convictions, ' some
recent decisions recognize that our system convicts the innocent.' The
newly-presented evidence rule flows from the principle articulated in
Winship that it is preferable to free the guilty than convict the innocent. 2 '
Adopting the newly-presented evidence rule will add meaningful content
to this ideal. Without the newly-presented evidence rule, our justice
system will continue to convict the innocent and fail to fully account for
that injustice in adjudicating habeas corpus petitions. This twofold error
runs counter to our most basic notions of justice, and it must not endure.
120. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh. 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2o06); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (993).
121. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 32o n.25 (2oo2) ("[W]e cannot ignore the fact that in
recent years a disturbing number of inmates on death row have been exonerated. These exonerations
have included at least one mentally retarded person who unwittingly confessed to a crime that he did
not commit."); see also Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2544-46 (Souter, J., dissenting).
122. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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